Unlike its northern neighbour, South Korea can break free of China’s orbit

North and South Korea’s differences have divided the peninsula for decades, but the rollercoaster year of 2020 has revealed a growing commonality: their over-dependence on China. Seoul’s reliance on Beijing for both exports and foreign investments has surged amidst the coronavirus pandemic. North Korea, meanwhile, has leaned ever more on China as it struggles to cope with both longstanding challenges—the strict Western sanctions imposed in response to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme—as well as fresh ones, from the coronavirus pandemic which has cramped lucrative Chinese tourism due to border closures, to severe flood and typhoon damage.

If Pyongyang has little option but to count on Beijing to supply it with food and fuel amidst what is shaping up to be the worst economic crisis in nearly a decade for the isolated nation, Seoul is not in the same boat. Indeed, South Korea, which closed out 2020 with a record high for the stock exchange, has the tools it needs to break away from China, a split which could warm up its relationship with its star-spangled ally when Joe Biden takes his seat in the White House. Why, then, is the Moon administration cosying up ever closer to Beijing, at great risk, as the world moves into 2021?

Pyongyang banks on China’s helping hand

The pandemic, with the travel restrictions and economic downturn that it has entailed, has proven particularly challenging for North Korea, despite Pyongyang’s ludicrous claim of having had zero cases of the novel coronavirus. The information trickling out of the hermetically sealed nation has led analysts to believe that the country is currently in the firm grip of a crippling recession, with the population of 25 million suffering severe electricity and food shortages. Kim Jong Un’s recent admission that his five year plan for the economy had failed “tremendously”, a rare public acknowledgment, only underscored how dire the straits are in which Pyongyang finds itself. Unfortunately, North Korea is attempting to rally, not by reducing subsidies to their nuclear weapons programme, but by increasing illegal activity including cybercrime, swindling millions of dollars in foreign currency from unsuspecting victims from India to Chile.

That North Korea gets away with such unscrupulous behaviour is only thanks to China. Indeed, Beijing has long propped up the Kim regime, from the flouting of UN sanctions on North Korean coal exports - 555 times last year - to unpublicised aid in the form of food, oil and medical supplies. The US is alert to Beijing’s offerings to Pyongyang and has already blacklisted companies in China for consorting with North Korean coal exporters. But the problem does not stop there as analysts suggest that the hermit kingdom’s ever proliferating nuclear programme might even be traced back to Beijing by way of an “information exchange programme between North Korea and countries like China and Russia.”

Seoul also turning to Beijing?

The Chinese have bolstered Kim’s cash flow and power in his time of need, yet there’s no such thing as a free lunch. North Korea has become dangerously reliant on a Beijing that hasn’t hesitated to wield its economic leverage to keep countries in line. Pyongyang has little other choice, but Seoul’s increasing dependence on Beijing, given its strong economy and stable of international allies, is more of a mystery.

In the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s administration instigated a not-so-subtle rapprochement with China in a bid to both hedge their bets financially and to encourage inter-Korea talks about dismantling North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. What’s more, the relationship shows no signs of cooling off with the hotly anticipated tête-à-tête in the Blue House between Moon and Chinese President Xi Jinping finally seeming to take concrete shape.

This increasing chumminess with Beijing is a risky gamble for Moon, both domestically and abroad. 61.7% of South Koreans have a negative view of Moon's presidency and scepticism towards China is at an all-time high amongst his electorate, meaning that his legacy may take a body blow from his decision to prioritise better relations with China. Indeed, many South Koreans have not forgotten Beijing’s tendency to impose harsh measures to coax Seoul into supporting its foreign policy priorities—when South Korea wanted to install an American missile defence system, China’s economic retaliation was swift and brutal, with boycotts costing South Korea billions.

Has Washington still got a friend in Seoul?

Seoul’s deepening relationship with Beijing also risks alienating the United States, long South Korea’s greatest ally. Washington considers South Korea a “linchpin” in East Asia—a relationship which goes both ways, since South Korea relies heavily on the protection of the US nuclear shield and the 30,000 American military personnel stationed on the peninsula.

Now that Donald Trump and his “America first” rhetoric are on the way out of the White House, South Korea has an opportunity to reinvigorate its relationship with its oldest ally, something which could strengthen both countries’ defences against Chinese economic coercion. Seoul’s increasing dependence on Beijing, however, will likely raise red flags in Washington—one analyst already estimated that South Korea is the “weak link” in the United States’ security policy in the region.

North Korea is too isolated and impoverished to wean itself off of China, but South Korea has both the balance sheet and the address book to choose a different path. The Moon administration should ask themselves if it’s worth risking repercussions from the incoming Biden administration in exchange for an unpredictable trade partner and a flimsy chance at counteracting nuclear proliferation in North Korea, which shows no signs of desisting from its sanctions-busting, cybercrime or nuclear narcissism anytime soon.

This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or management of EconoTimes